9 – Silence Isnāt Mandatory
By į¹¬hÄnissaro Bhikkhu (Geoffrey DeGraff)
From https://www.dhammatalks.org/books/Noble&True/Section0009.html
Sensory Perception in the JhÄnas
On the afternoon of his last day, as he was walking to the park where he would be totally unbound, the Buddha stopped to rest at the foot of a tree by the side of the road.
There he was approached by Pukkusa Mallaputta—a student of the Buddhaās first teacher, Äįø·Ära KÄlÄma—who proceeded to praise Äįø·Ära for the strength of his concentration:
Äįø·Ära had sat in concentration, percipient and alert, as 500 carts passed by on a nearby road, but he neither saw them nor heard a sound.
Only later did he learn about them, when another man traveling along the road asked him whether he had seen or heard the carts pass by.
The Buddha responded by telling Pukkusa of a time when he had been sitting in concentration in a threshing barn, percipient and alert, when the rain was pouring, lightning was flashing, and a thunderbolt killed two men and four oxen nearby, and yet he hadnāt seen anything nor heard a sound.
He, too, didnāt know what had happened until he left the barn and asked someone why so many people had gathered nearby.
Pukkusa was so impressed by this story that, in his words, he took his conviction in Äįø·Ära and āwinnowed it before a high windā and āwashed it away in the swift current of a river.
ā He then took refuge in the Triple Gem, presented the Buddha with a pair of gold-colored robes, and left.
This incident provides a curious footnote to an incident in an earlier set of stories:
the Buddhaās own account of the events leading up to his awakening.
After leaving home, he had studied with Äįø·Ära, who had taught him how to reach a formless concentration attainment called the dimension of nothingness, in which the mind is focused on a single perception:
āThere is nothing.
ā Yet when the Buddha-to-be had mastered that attainment, he realized that it didnāt constitute the end of suffering.
So he left Äįø·Ära in search of a better teacher, and eventually pursued awakening on his own.
The point of this account was that, to gain awakening, the Buddha needed more than just a concentration attainment.
He also needed to master the skills of the four noble truths so as to develop dispassion for all fabricated states of mind, including the most profound states of concentration.
Only then could he reach the deathless.
The story of the Buddhaās conversation with Pukkusa, in contrast, reads like an anti-climax.
Pukkusaās interest goes no further than concentration, and he bases his conviction in the Buddha simply on the fact that the latterās concentration was very strong.
As for whether the Buddhaās concentration was actually stronger than Äįø·Äraās, thereās no way of knowing, because Äįø·Ära wasnāt presented with the same test.
The story does, however, raise an important question.
It shows that the Canon recognizes stages of concentration in which the physical senses fall silent—and that the Buddha, as an awakened one, had mastered those stages—but it says nothing about whether those stages are necessary for awakening.
Buddhaghosa—in his Visuddhimagga and in the commentaries he compiled from the ancient Sinhalese commentaries on the Pali suttas, or discourses—says that it is a mandatory feature of jhÄna that the external senses fall silent, but that jhÄna is not necessary for awakening.
Some modern practice traditions agree with Buddhaghosa on both counts, but others—who disagree with Buddhaghosa on the second count, saying that jhÄna is necessary for awakening—differ from one another on the first:
some groups maintaining that, Yes, the external senses must fall silent in jhÄna, others maintaining that, No, they donāt.
I have already explored elsewhere the issue of whether jhÄna is necessary for awakening—concluding that, according to the Pali suttas, it is (see Right Mindfulness, Appendix Three).
Here I would like to examine what the suttas have to say about the other issue:
whether jhÄna counts as jhÄna only if the external senses fall silent.
If the answer is Yes, that means that a person can attain awakening only after developing concentration to the point where all input from the external senses is blocked.
This is clearly an issue of great practical importance for anyone aiming at true release.
Background:
the Nine Attainments
Any attempt to determine the suttasā stance on this issue has to begin by analyzing how they describe the stages of concentration that can act as the bases for awakening.
The suttasā most extensive standard list describes nine stages in all.
The first four stages, called the four jhÄnas, are the only members of the list included in the standard definition of right concentration in discussions of the noble eightfold path (see
SN 45.8). However, according to
MN 140, the remaining stages—which the suttas call the āformlessnesses beyond forms,ā and which modern discussions call the āformless jhÄnasā—are simply applications of the equanimity found in the fourth jhÄna.
(Here, for the purpose of keeping these formless stages distinct from the four jhÄnas while at the same time saving space, I will refer to them as the āformless attainments.
ā Any reference to āthe jhÄnasā will mean the four jhÄnas, and not the formless attainments.
)
Because many passages in the suttas describe how awakening can be based on any of the four jhÄnas or the five formless attainments, all nine stages seem to be rightly classed as right concentration.
The standard description of the nine stages is this:
[1] āThere is the case where a monk, quite secluded from sensuality, secluded from unskillful mental qualities, enters and remains in the first jhÄna:
rapture and pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by directed thought and evaluation.
[2] āWith the stilling of directed thoughts and evaluations, he enters and remains in the second jhÄna:
rapture and pleasure born of concentration, unification of awareness free from directed thought and evaluation—internal assurance.
[3] āWith the fading of rapture, he remains equanimous, mindful, and alert, and senses pleasure with the body.
He enters and remains in the third jhÄna, of which the noble ones declare, āEquanimous and mindful, he has a pleasant abiding.
ā
[4] āWith the abandoning of pleasure and pain—as with the earlier disappearance of joy and distress—he enters and remains in the fourth jhÄna:
purity of equanimity and mindfulness, neither pleasure nor pain.
[5] āWith the complete transcending of perceptions [mental notes] of (physical) form, with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not attending to perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) āInfinite space,ā he enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space.
[6] āWith the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) āInfinite consciousness,ā he enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.
[7] āWith the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) āThere is nothing,ā he enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness.
[This was the stage mastered by Äįø·Ära.
]
[8] āWith the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, he enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception.
[9] āWith the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, he enters and remains in the cessation of perception and feeling.
ā —
AN 9.32
Some suttas—such as
MN 121 and
SN 40.9—mention another stage of concentration, called the themeless concentration of awareness (animitta-ceto-samÄdhi), that can also be used as a basis for awakening:
The monk—not attending to the perception of the dimension of nothingness, not attending to the perception of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception—attends to the singleness based on the themeless concentration of awareness.
ā —
MN 121
Because this themeless concentration of awareness, like the cessation of perception and feeling, follows on the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, there is the question as to whether the two stages are identical.
MN 44 suggests that theyāre not, saying that āthemeless contactā is one of the first contacts that a meditator experiences on emerging from the cessation of perception and feeling.
This suggests that the themeless concentration lies on the threshold of the cessation of perception and feeling, but is not identical with it.
Itās important to note that the mere attainment of any of these stages of concentration does not guarantee awakening.
As
AN 4.178 notes, it is possible to attain a āpeaceful awareness-releaseā without oneās heart leaping at the idea of the cessation of self-identification or the breaching of ignorance.
MN 113 notes that a person can go as far as the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception and, lacking integrity, exalt himself and disparage others over the fact that he has gained that attainment whereas other people havenāt.
MN 106 notes that itās possible, on reaching the same level, to relish and cling to the subtle equanimity experienced there.
In all of these cases, if these defects of insight and character are not remedied, the meditator will make no further progress toward awakening.
The one possible exception to the principle that right concentration, on its own, cannot achieve awakening is the ninth stage in the standard list:
the cessation of perception and feeling.
Perception, here, means the mental note that identifies and recognizes things and events.
Feeling means feeling-tones of pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain.
The Visuddhimagga (XXIII.
18) states that anyone who has reached this attainment must also attain, at the very least, the penultimate stage of awakening:
non-return.
The suttas, however, are more equivocal on the issue.
On the one hand,
MN 113 does not list this attainment as a stage of concentration that a person without integrity could attain.
At the same time, many of the suttasā descriptions of this attainment include the phrase, āand, as he sees (that) with discernment, his effluents are completely ended.
ā These two points suggest that, as one leaves this attainment, the depth of concentration has automatically primed the mind for liberating insight.
However, not all of the suttasā descriptions of this attainment include that concluding phrase (see, for example,
DN 15 and
AN 9.32), which may imply that the insight is not automatic.
At the same time, even if the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling does automatically lead to awakening, we should note that itās not the only totally non-percipient stage of concentration recognized by the suttas.
The other is the meditation that leads a person, after death, to be reborn in the dimension of non-percipient beings.
This dimension is mentioned in
DN 1 and
DN 15, but the meditation leading there is not part of the standard list of concentration attainments, nor is it described by the suttas in any detail.
What the suttas do indicate clearly is that the dimension of non-percipient beings is not a noble attainment, for as
DN 1 notes, if a perception arises in the mind of a being there, that being falls from the dimension.
If the being is then reborn in the human world and practices meditation, he/she will be unable to remember previous lifetimes and so may come to a conclusion that fosters wrong view:
that beings arise out of nothing, spontaneously and without cause.
This view would not occur to a person who has reached even the first stage of awakening, so the dimension of non-percipient beings is obviously not a noble state.
So the mere attainment of concentration—even to the extent of being totally free from perception—does not guarantee awakening.
This fact is reflected in the two main ways in which the suttas describe a person practicing concentration.
In some cases, they say simply that the meditator enters and remains in a particular stage of concentration.
In others, they say that the meditator, while remaining in that stage, analyzes it in terms of the fabrications of which it is composed, gains a sense of dispassion for those fabrications, and as a result gains release.
The first sort of description falls under what
AN 4.41 calls the ādevelopment of concentration that leads to a pleasant abiding in the here and nowā;
the second falls under what the same sutta calls the ādevelopment of concentration that leads to the ending of the effluents.
ā This element of analysis added to the practice of concentration is what can lead to awakening.
MN 52 and
AN 9.36 describe how this happens, with the latter giving the more extensive description of the two.
After mastering a particular stage of concentration, the meditator analyzes it in terms of the five aggregates of which it is composed and then develops a series of perceptions around those aggregates aimed at developing a sense of disenchantment and dispassion for them.
The dispassion is what then leads to release.
For instance, with the first jhÄna:
āThere is the case where a monkā¦ enters and remains in the first jhÄna:
rapture and pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by directed thought and evaluation.
He regards whatever phenomena there that are connected with form, feeling, perception, fabrications, and consciousness, as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a disintegration, an emptiness, not-self.
He turns his mind away from those phenomena, and having done so, inclines his mind to the property of deathlessness:
āThis is peace, this is exquisite—the resolution of all fabrications;
the relinquishment of all acquisitions;
the ending of craving;
dispassion;
cessation;
unbinding.
ā
āStaying right there, he reaches the ending of the effluents.
Or, if not, then—through this very Dhamma-passion, this Dhamma-delight, and from the total ending of the five lower fetters—he is due to arise spontaneously (in the Pure Abodes), there to be totally unbound, never again to return from that world.
ā —
AN 9.36
The sutta then describes a similar process for each of the concentration attainments up through the dimension of nothingness, after which it concludes:
āThus, as far as the perception-attainments go, that is as far as gnosis-penetration goes.
As for these two dimensions—the attainment of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception and the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling—I tell you that they are to be rightly explained by those monks who are meditators, skilled at attainment, skilled at attainment-emergence, who have attained and emerged in dependence on them.
ā —
AN 9.36
In other words, unlike its treatment of the first seven stages of concentration, the sutta does not describe how one might analyze the last two attainments so as to gain release.
Why these two attainments are treated differently from the others is suggested by a similar discussion in
MN 111. There the Buddha praises Ven.
SÄriputta for his penetrating discernment in being able to ferret out mental qualities as he experiences them in the practice of concentration.
The discussion applies a standard formula to each attainment from the first jhÄna up through the dimension of nothingness, and then switches gear to a second formula that differs from the first formula in two important respects.
The difference can be illustrated by comparing the discussion for the dimension of nothingness, which follows the first formula, and the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, which follows the second:
āAnd further, with the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) āThere is nothing,ā SÄriputta entered and remained in the dimension of nothingness.
Whatever qualities there are in the dimension of nothingness—the perception of the dimension of nothingness, singleness of mind, contact, feeling, perception, intention, consciousness, desire, decision, persistence, mindfulness, equanimity, and attention—he ferreted them out one after another.
Known to him they arose, known to him they became established, known to him they subsided.
He discerned, āSo this is how these qualities, not having been, come into play.
Having been, they vanish.
ā He remained unattracted and unrepelled with regard to those qualities, independent, detached, released, dissociated, with an awareness rid of barriers.
He discerned that āThere is a further escape,ā and pursuing it, he confirmed that āThere is.
ā
āAnd further, with the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, SÄriputta entered and remained in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception.
He emerged mindfully from that attainment.
On emerging mindfully from that attainment, he regarded the past qualities that had ceased and changed:
āSo this is how these qualities, not having been, come into play.
Having been, they vanish.
ā He remained unattracted and unrepelled with regard to those qualities, independent, detached, released, dissociated, with an awareness rid of barriers.
He discerned that āThere is a further escape,ā and pursuing it, he confirmed that āThere is.
āā —
MN 111
The important differences in the two formulae are these:
(1) The first formula lists in great detail the qualities that SÄriputta ferreted out, whereas the second doesnāt.
This may relate to the fact that perception in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception is so subtle and attenuated that a meditator in that dimension cannot label mental qualities clearly.
(2) In the second formula, the Buddha is careful to say that SÄriputta did the analysis after emerging from the attainment, and that the analysis referred to past qualities, whereas he doesnāt qualify the earlier discussion in this way.
This indicates that it is possible to do this sort of analysis while staying in any of the attainments up through the dimension of nothingness, whereas in the final two attainments, the level of perception is so attenuated that any of the perceptions used in analysis would destroy the attainment.
For this reason, these two attainments can be analyzed only after the meditator has emerged from them.
This is why the Buddha treats the arising of discernment with regard to these final two attainments in much less detail than he does with regard to the lower seven.
This point will have an important bearing on the following discussion.
But the main lesson to draw from these passages is that concentration, simply as a pleasant abiding in the here and now, cannot lead to awakening.
It needs the added activity of discernment for there to be full release.
Silence in the Formless Attainments
Modern discussions of the question as to whether the external senses have to fall silent in right concentration for there to be the possibility of awakening tend to focus on the first jhÄna, and for two connected reasons:
(1) It is the lowest stage of concentration to be classed as right concentration.
(2) As
MN 52 and
AN 9.36 show, a meditator practicing for the sake of awakening need not master all nine stages of concentration.
Itās possible to gain awakening based on a mastery of just the first.
Thus, if a stage of concentration in which the physical senses fall silent is required for awakening, this stipulation must apply to the first jhÄna.
Three passages in the suttas seem to provide clear evidence that this proposition is incorrect, in that they describe attainments where the external senses fall silent, but without including the first jhÄna—or any of the other jhÄnas—in their descriptions.
A.1:
The first passage is
AN 9.37, where Ven.
Änanda discusses four levels of concentration in which the meditator can be percipient yet without any sensitivity to the physical senses.
Three of these levels are the first three of the formless attainments.
The fourth is the concentration that follows on the attainment of full awakening.
The four jhÄnas, however, are not mentioned as meeting this description at all.
Ven. Änanda said, āItās amazing, friends, itās astounding, how the Blessed One who knows and sees, the worthy one, rightly self-awakened, has attained and recognized an opening in a confined place for the purification of beings, for the overcoming of sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of pain and distress, for the attainment of the right method, and for the realization of unbinding, where the eye will be, and those forms, and yet one will not be sensitive to that dimension;
where the ear will be, and those soundsā¦ where the nose will be, and those aromasā¦ where the tongue will be, and those flavorsā¦ where the body will be, and those tactile sensations, and yet one will not be sensitive to that dimension.
ā
When this was said, Ven.
UdÄyin said to Ven.
Änanda, āIs one percipient when not sensitive to that dimension, my friend, or unpercipient?
ā
[Ven. Änanda:
] āOne is percipient when not sensitive to that dimension, my friend, not unpercipient.
ā
[Ven. UdÄyin:
] āWhen not sensitive to that dimension, my friend, one is percipient of what?
ā
[Ven. Änanda:
] āThere is the case where, with the complete transcending of perceptions of (physical) form, with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not attending to perceptions of multiplicity, (perceiving,) āInfinite space,ā one enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of space.
Percipient in this way, one is not sensitive to that dimension [i.
e., the dimensions of the five physical senses].
āAnd further, with the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of space, (perceiving,) āInfinite consciousness,ā one enters and remains in the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.
Percipient in this way, too, one is not sensitive to that dimension.
āAnd further, with the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, (perceiving,) āThere is nothing,ā one enters and remains in the dimension of nothingness.
Percipient in this way, too, one is not sensitive to that dimension.
āOnce, friend, when I was staying in SÄketa at the Game Refuge in the Black Forest, the nun Jaį¹ila-BhÄgikÄ went to where I was staying, and on arrival—having bowed to me—stood to one side.
As she was standing there, she said to me:
āThe concentration whereby—neither pressed down nor forced back, nor with fabrication kept blocked or suppressed—still as a result of release, contented as a result of standing still, and as a result of contentment one is not agitated:
This concentration is said by the Blessed One to be the fruit of what?
ā
āI said to her, āSister, the concentration whereby—neither pressed down nor forced back, nor kept in place by the fabrications of forceful restraint—still as a result of release, contented as a result of standing still, and as a result of contentment one is not agitated:
This concentration is said by the Blessed One to be the fruit of gnosis [arahantship].
ā Percipient in this way, too, one is not sensitive to that dimension.
ā —
AN 9.37
Because this passage, when describing attainments where the external senses fall silent even when the meditator is percipient, mentions only the first three formless attainments and the concentration of arahantship, it seems to give clear support to the idea that there is no need for the physical senses to fall silent in every level of right concentration.
A person could attain any of the four jhÄnas and yet still hear sounds, etc.
, and—as
AN 9.36 notes—could use that stage of concentration to attain full awakening.
A.2:
A careful look at another passage—the standard description of the dimension of the infinitude of space, the first attainment in Ven.
Änandaās list—shows why the attainments in his list differ from the four jhÄnas in this regard.
The description states that the meditator enters and remains in this dimension āwith the complete transcending of perceptions of form, with the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not attending to perceptions of multiplicity.
ā As noted above, the word āperceptionā here carries the meaning of mental note or label, the act of recognizing or identifying a mental object.
So, to move from the fourth jhÄna to the dimension of the infinitude of space, itās necessary that mental labels of resistance disappear, and that the meditator transcend mental labels of form and pay no attention to mental labels of multiplicity.
Two of these terms, resistance and multiplicity, require explanation.
āResistanceā (paį¹igha) can be understood in two ways.
DN 15 identifies it as the type of contact that allows mental activity to detect the presence of forms.
What this apparently means is that mental acts can recognize the presence of physical objects primarily because physical objects put up resistance to any other objects that might invade their space.
However, Buddhaghosa, in the Visuddhimagga (X.
16), follows the Abhidhamma in defining āresistanceā as contact at the five external senses.
Because he gives no sutta reference to support this interpretation, it is the weaker of the two.
However, there is a sutta passage—in
MN 137—that defines āmultiplicity (nÄnattÄ)ā as the objects of the five senses:
forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations.
In other words, this passage assigns to āmultiplicityā the meaning that Buddhaghosa assigns to āresistance.
ā
MN 137 then contrasts multiplicity with the word, āsingleness (ekattÄ),ā which it identifies as the first four formless attainments.
Thus, regardless of whether perceptions of sensory input are called perceptions of resistance or perceptions of multiplicity, the practical upshot is that a meditator entering and staying in the dimension of the infinitude of space would, at the very least, have to pay no attention to any mental labels that would recognize or identify objects present to the physical senses.
If āresistanceā means contact at the five senses, then such perceptions would have to disappear.
This leads to a question:
Following the interpretation drawn from
MN 137, why would the simple act of not paying attention to perceptions of the objects of the senses make a meditator insensitive to the presence of those objects?
The answer lies in the fact that, in the suttasā descriptions of the stages of sensory awareness, perception plays a role at two stages in the process.
—In
MN 18, for instance, perception comes after sensory contact and the feelings that arise based on the contact.
To ignore perceptions of multiplicity at this stage of the process would not make one insensitive to the objects of the senses.
They would be present enough to give rise to perceptions, but the meditator would simply pay those perceptions no attention.
—However, in the standard formula for dependent co-arising (see, for example,
SN 12.2), perception—as a sub-factor of fabrication (see
MN 44)—also occurs prior to sensory contact.
To pay no attention to perceptions of multiplicity at this stage of the process, and to pay sole attention to the perception, āinfinite spaceā instead, would allow the meditator to become insensitive to the physical senses and their objects.
The same would be true if perceptions of sensory input were indicated by āperceptions of resistanceā and those perceptions were to disappear.
It would seem clear that because the standard formula for the nine concentration attainments mentions these requirements beginning only with the dimension of the infinitude of space, they are not required for any of the lower levels.
For a meditator in, say, the fourth jhÄna, perceptions identifying sounds would not have disappeared.
Even though he/she would ordinarily not pay attention to those perceptions, he or she could, for a brief moment, note a perception identifying a sound and then drop it, returning to the object of his/her concentration, and—as long as this is done mindfully and with equanimity—this would still count as being in the fourth jhÄna.
Thus there seems good reason to take
AN 9.37 and the standard formula for the dimension of the infinitude of space as authoritative in showing that it is not necessary for the physical senses to fall silent in any of the four jhÄnas.
A.3:
Further support for this reading of
AN 9.37 comes from a passage in
MN 43 in which Ven.
SÄriputta lists the attainments that can be known with a purified intellect-consciousness—the consciousness of mental phenomena—divorced from the five physical sense faculties:
i.
e., the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body.
His list consists of the first three formless attainments, and makes no mention of the four jhÄnas.
Ven. MahÄ Koį¹į¹hita:
āFriend, what can be known with the purified intellect-consciousness divorced from the five (sense) faculties?
ā
Ven. SÄriputta:
āFriend, with the purified intellect-consciousness divorced from the five faculties, the dimension of the infinitude of space can be known (as) āinfinite space,ā the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness can be known (as) āinfinite consciousness,ā the dimension of nothingness can be known (as) āThere is nothing.
ā
Ven. MahÄ Koį¹į¹hita:
āWith what does one know a quality that can be known?
ā
Ven. SÄriputta:
āOne knows a quality that can be known with the eye of discernment.
ā
Ven. MahÄ Koį¹į¹hita:
āAnd what is the purpose of discernment?
ā
Ven. SÄriputta:
āThe purpose of discernment is direct knowledge, its purpose is full comprehension, its purpose is abandoning.
ā —
MN 43
In other words, the only concentration attainments that can be known by a purified intellect-consciousness divorced from the five physical sense faculties are the first three formless attainments.
The passage from
MN 111 quoted above helps to explain why the remaining two formless attainments are not listed here:
They cannot be known through the eye of discernment while one is in those attainments.
A meditator can analyze them with discernment only after he/she has left the attainment.
The same point would also apply to the fourth attainment in Ven.
Änandaās list, the fruit of gnosis.
Thus to be included in Ven.
SÄriputtaās list in
MN 43, an attainment has to meet three criteria:
(a) One can analyze it with discernment while one is in that attainment, and oneās consciousness is (b) purified and (c) divorced from the five physical sense faculties.
Ven. SÄriputta does not explain what he means by āpurifiedā here.
Ostensibly, it could mean any of three things:
purified of defilement, as in the Buddhaās standard description of his own mastery of the fourth jhÄna (see, for example,
MN 4);
having purity of equanimity and mindfulness (as in the standard description of the fourth jhÄna);
or, alternatively, it could simply be another way of saying āpurely divorced from the five physical senses,ā in which case the second criterion above (b) would be identical with the third (c).
Now, of the three criteria,
MN 111 shows that all four jhÄnas meet the first criterion, because a meditator can analyze them with discernment while dwelling in them, and the fourth jhÄna meets the first two possible meanings of the second.
The fact that the fourth jhÄna is not listed in
MN 43 means that it does not meet the third criterion (or, what amounts to the same thing, the third possible meaning of the second).
In other words, oneās consciousness while in the fourth jhÄna is not divorced from the five physical senses.
If those senses do not fall silent in the fourth jhÄna, the same could be said of the lower three jhÄnas as well.
In this way, all three passages—
AN 9.37,
MN 43, and the standard description of the dimension of the infinitude of space—clearly show that there is no need for the physical senses to fall silent while in the four jhÄnas.
This means further that, to gain awakening, there is no need to attain a stage of concentration that blocks out all awareness of those senses.
Awakening can occur when based on any of the four jhÄnas even when a background awareness of the physical senses is present.
Buddhaghosaās Interpretations
Buddhaghosa, however, argues that none of these three passages should be taken at face value in proving that a meditator can sense external sensory input in the jhÄnas, and instead should be interpreted to allow for the opposite:
that the external senses actually fall silent in the first jhÄna.
But when we examine his arguments—and those of his modern supporters—to prove his interpretations of these passages, we find that they leave much to be desired.
Because his most substantial argument focuses on passage A.
2, we will begin with his discussion of that passage first.
A.2:
In Visuddhimagga X.
17, he argues that the phrase, āwith the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and not attending to perceptions of multiplicity,ā should not be read as indicating a step that occurs only with the entry into the dimension of the infinitude of space.
Instead, it should be read as describing a step that had already occurred earlier in the ascending stages of concentration.
He bases his argument on two analogies.
The first is that, in the formula for the fourth jhÄna, the phrase, āwith the abandoning of pleasure and painā is actually describing a step that occurred earlier in the stages of concentration, and not just with the fourth jhÄna.
There is, however, no basis for his drawing this analogy here.
The third jhÄna, even though it is marked by equanimity, is also marked by āpleasure sensed with the body.
ā This pleasure is abandoned only with the entry into the fourth jhÄna.
Furthermore,
MN 44 shows why pain is not really abandoned until pleasure is also abandoned:
[VisÄkha:
] āIn what way is pleasant feeling pleasant, lady, and in what way painful?
ā
[Sister DhammadinnÄ:
] āPleasant feeling is pleasant in remaining, and painful in changing, friend VisÄkha.
Painful feeling is painful in remaining and pleasant in changing.
Neither-pleasant-nor-painful feeling is pleasant in occurring together with knowledge, and painful in occurring without knowledge.
ā
In other words, even pleasant feeling contains pain in the fact that it changes.
Thus the meditator, when going through the stages of jhÄna, does not abandon either pleasure or pain until entering the fourth jhÄna.
The phrase describing this step is not referring to anything that happened earlier in the stages of concentration.
For this reason, Buddhaghosaās first argument by analogy does not hold.
His second argument by analogy is that the description of the third noble path—the path to non-return—mentions the abandoning of fetters, such as self-identity view, that were already abandoned as a result of the earlier noble paths, and so the description of the entry into the dimension of the infinitude of space should be read the same way, as mentioning something that had already happened earlier.
This argument, too, does not hold.
In the descriptions of the noble paths, the fetters abandoned with each path are explicitly mentioned in the description of that path, with the ascending descriptions being cumulative:
A person who has attained the first path has abandoned x;
a person attaining the third has abandoned x and y;
and so forth.
For there to be an analogy here, then if the disappearance of perceptions of resistance and lack of attention to perceptions of multiplicity were a feature of the first jhÄna, they would have to be mentioned in the description of the first jhÄna.
But they arenāt.
This is why Buddhaghosaās second argument by analogy also does not hold.
A.1:
As for
AN 9.37—in which Ven.
Änanda lists the attainments where one is percipient without being percipient of the five external senses and their objects—Buddhaghosaās commentary to that sutta explains the absence of the four jhÄnas in Ven.
Änandaās list as follows:
The object of the four jhÄnas—the internal mental image on which they are focused—counts as a āformā and so, to avoid confusion with the forms that are the objects of the eye, Ven.
Änanda chose to exclude those jhÄnas from his list.
This explanation, however, ignores the fact that Ven.
Änanda explicitly assigns āthose formsā to the eye—as he assigns āthose soundsā to the ear, etc.
—so if he had meant to include the four jhÄnas in his list, he could have done so without causing confusion.
His listeners would have known clearly that āthose formsā referred to forms seen by the eye, and not to internal forms seen by the mind.
Thus Buddhaghosaās argument here, too, is unconvincing.
Itās more likely that Ven.
Änanda excluded the four jhÄnas from his list because the meditator can still be sensitive to the five external senses when in those jhÄnas.
Still, modern proponents of the position that the external senses fall silent in the first jhÄna have proposed another reason for not taking
AN 9.37 at face value in this way.
Their proposal is that Ven.
Änanda originally included the four jhÄnas in his list, but—through a faulty transmission of the text—those jhÄnas disappeared between his time and ours.
The argument in support of this proposal focuses on the form of the sutta:
Because the sutta is found in the Nines section of the Aį¹
guttara NikÄya, and because itās part of a chapter in which all the other suttas list all nine concentration attainments, it should list them all as well, replacing the cessation of perception and feeling with the concentration that is the fruit of arahantship.
This argument, however, misses two important points.
The first is that
AN 9.37, following the general pattern in the Nines, contains nine items already:
the five physical senses, the first three formless attainments, and the concentration that is the fruit of arahantship.
Five plus three plus one equals nine.
Thus the sutta already qualifies for the Nines.
The second point is that not all the formless attainments qualify for inclusion in this sutta.
Ven. Änanda here is talking about states in which the meditator is percipient.
As
AN 9.36 points out, the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception and the cessation of perception and feeling do not count as percipient states, so they canāt be included in Ven.
Änandaās list.
Thus only the first three formless attainments qualify for inclusion.
To include the four jhÄnas along with them and the concentration that is the fruit of arahantship—four plus three plus one—would give a total of eight, which would actually disqualify the sutta from inclusion in the Nines.
For these reasons, the modern argument from form is unconvincing—which means that the face-value interpretation of
AN 9.37 still stands:
A meditator can still be sensitive to the five external senses when in the four jhÄnas.
A.3:
As for
MN 43—in which Ven.
SÄriputta lists what can be known by the purified intellect-consciousness divorced from the five faculties—Buddhaghosa, in his commentary to that sutta, maintains that the phrase, āpurified intellect-consciousness divorced from the five faculties,ā is a reference to the fourth jhÄna.
This presents him with a problem, though, in that the consciousness of the fourth jhÄna does not directly know the three formless attainments given in Ven.
SÄriputtaās list.
One would have to be in those attainments for oneās consciousness to directly know them.
To get around this problem, Buddhaghosa maintains that ācan be known byā can also mean, ācan be known as a result ofā—in other words, a meditator can attain the three formless attainments as a result of attaining the consciousness of the fourth jhÄna.
This is not an idiomatic reading of the passage, but grammatically it is a legitimate interpretation of the instrumental case, the case in which the word āconsciousnessā appears in the sutta, and it allows Buddhaghosa to maintain that consciousness is divorced from the physical senses in the fourth jhÄna.
Because, as noted above, the suttas do not describe the jhÄnas below the fourth as āpurified,ā Buddhaghosa apparently felt no need to mention the lower jhÄnas in this context.
However, his interpretation presents him with a further question:
If ācan be known,ā means, ācan be experienced as a result of the fourth jhÄna,ā why is the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception not listed as well?
To answer this question, Buddhaghosa quotes part of the above passage from
MN 111 to add a further stipulation to the meaning of āknown,ā saying that the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception is not listed because no one except the Buddha—not even Ven.
SÄriputta—can resolve it distinctly into its individual phenomena.
In other words, ācan be knownā must also mean, ācan be analyzed into its individual phenomena.
ā This would fit with the statement in
MN 43 that ācan be known,ā means, ācan be known with the eye of discernment.
ā
The question that Buddhaghosa fails to address, however, is this:
Why doesnāt Ven.
SÄriputta include the fourth jhÄna in his list?
After all, it meets both of Buddhaghosaās stipulations for ācan be knownā:
As
MN 111 shows, the fourth jhÄna can be known as a result of attaining the fourth jhÄna, and it can be analyzed into its individual phenomena.
If it met Buddhaghosaās underlying assumption—that consciousness in the fourth jhÄna is divorced from the five physical senses—then it would have to be included in the list as well.
But itās not.
This leaves a gaping hole in Buddhaghosaās interpretation—an inconsistency that undermines the interpretation as a whole.
The most consistent interpretation of Ven.
SÄriputtaās list in
MN 43 is the one stated above:
To be included in the list, a concentration attainment needs to meet three criteria:
A meditator can analyze it with discernment while in that attainment, his/her consciousness is purified, and that consciousness is divorced from the five physical sense faculties.
Because the fourth jhÄna meets the first two criteria, the fact that it is not listed in
MN 43 is a sign that it does not meet the third.
In other words, oneās consciousness while in that attainment—or in the lower jhÄnas—is not divorced from the five physical senses.
This means that, despite the various arguments proposed for interpreting
AN 9.37,
MN 43, and the standard description of the infinitude of space to support the opposite position, all three passages in fact offer clear proof that—from the perspective of the suttas—the physical senses do not need to fall silent in any of the four jhÄnas.
Right concentration can still be right even when a background sensitivity to the physical senses is present.
More Arguments for Silence in the First JhÄna
However, proponents of the position that concentration counts as jhÄna only when the physical senses fall silent do not focus only on sutta passages whose face value has to be denied in order to maintain their position.
They also cite four passages that, they claim, give positive proof that the suttas openly support them.
Buddhaghosa cites one of these passages—
AN 10.72—but without explaining why it proves that the senses must fall silent in the first jhÄna;
modern supporters of his position provide an argument to bolster his citation, and add the other two citations to strengthen their case.
A close examination of these citations, though, shows that none of them actually support the position they are supposed to prove.
To see why, we have to look carefully at what each of the four passages has to say.
The following discussion treats them one by one, first quoting the passage, then stating the modern argument for āsoundproof jhÄnaā based on it, and finally showing how the passage does not support the argument as claimed.
B.1:
āQuite secluded from sensuality, secluded from unskillful qualities, one enters and remains in the first jhÄna.
ā —
DN 2
This passage at the beginning of the standard formula for the first jhÄna states the prerequisite events for entering that jhÄna.
The argument based on it is this:
āSensualityā here means the objects of the five senses.
Thus a meditator can enter the first jhÄna only when input from the five senses falls away.
The problem with this argument is that the suttas never define āsensualityā as the objects of the five senses.
Instead, they define sensuality as a passion for sensual resolves—the plans and intentions the mind formulates for sensual pleasures:
āThere are these five strings of sensuality.
Which five?
Forms cognizable via the eye—agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing;
sounds cognizable via the earā¦ aromas cognizable via the noseā¦ flavors cognizable via the tongueā¦ tactile sensations cognizable via the body—agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing.
But these are not sensuality.
They are called strings of sensuality in the discipline of the noble ones.
ā
The passion for his resolves is a manās sensuality,
not the beautiful sensual pleasures
found in the world.
The passion for his resolves is a manās sensuality.
The beauties remain as they are in the world,
while, in this regard,
the enlightened
subdue their desire.
—
AN 6.63
In light of this definition, āsecluded from sensualityā simply means that one has subdued oneās passion for sensual resolves.
One has not necessarily escaped the input from the senses.
And one has not abandoned all resolves.
As
MN 73 points out, unskillful resolves are abandoned in the first jhÄna.
Because the first jhÄna contains directed thought and evaluation, resolved on the single task of solidifying oneās focus on a single object, skillful resolves are actually a necessary part of the first jhÄna.
The singleness of the task taken on by directed thought and evaluation is what qualifies the first jhÄna as a state of singleness.
Only with the attainment of the second jhÄna are skillful resolves abandoned as well, leading to singleness on a higher level.
However, it has been further argued that āsensualityā in the standard formula for the first jhÄna has a special meaning—i.
e., the objects of the five senses—different from the definition given in
AN 6.63—or anywhere else in the suttas.
This argument, however, doesnāt accord with what we know of the Buddhaās teaching strategy.
As he said in
DN 16, he didnāt keep a secret teaching that he revealed only to a few people.
And because he repeated the formula for the jhÄnas so many times, itās unlikely that he would have forgotten to explain any special technical meanings for the terms the formula contains.
Assuming that he would have wanted his instructions to be useful and clear, we have to conclude that he would have been careful to explain what he meant by his terms—which indicates that āsensualityā in the jhÄna formula has the same meaning as in
AN 6.63.
So the phrase āsecluded from sensualityā in the description of the first jhÄna means nothing more than that meditators entering and remaining in the first jhÄna have to abandon sensual resolves.
Although—in focusing their minds on their meditation theme—they shouldnāt focus attention on input from the external senses, the standard formula doesnāt require them to block that input entirely from their awareness.
B.2:
āThere is the case where a monkā¦ enters and remains in the first jhÄna:
rapture and pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by directed thought and evaluation.
This is called a monk who, coming to the end of the cosmos, remains at the end of the cosmos.
ā¦ There is the case where a monkā¦ enters and remains in the second jhÄnaā¦ the third jhÄnaā¦ the fourth jhÄnaā¦ the dimension of the infinitude of spaceā¦ the dimension of the infinitude of consciousnessā¦ the dimension of nothingnessā¦ the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception.
This is called a monk who, coming to the end of the cosmos, remains at the end of the cosmos.
ā —
AN 9.38
The argument based on this passage states that ācosmosā (loka) here means the objects of the five senses.
Thus a meditator who has entered the first jhÄna—and all the remaining attainments—must have gone beyond the range of those senses.
This argument, however, ignores the definition for ācosmosā given in the same sutta:
āThese five strings of sensuality are, in the discipline of the noble ones, called the cosmos.
Which five?
Forms cognizable via the eye—agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing;
sounds cognizable via the earā¦ aromas cognizable via the noseā¦ flavors cognizable via the tongueā¦ tactile sensations cognizable via the body—agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing.
These are the five strings of sensuality that, in the discipline of the noble ones, are called the cosmos.
ā —
AN 9.38
In other words, the word ācosmosā in
AN 9.38 means the pleasant and enticing objects of the senses.
If the Buddha had wanted to state that all input from the physical senses is blotted out in all of the jhÄnas and formless attainments, he would have defined ācosmosā in this context as all objects of the physical senses.
But he didnāt.
He limited it to enticing sensory objects.
And as
AN 6.63 states, when one has subdued sensual desire, the beautiful objects remain as they were.
They are not blocked from awareness.
They simply lose their power.
This means that
AN 9.38 is not saying that input from the senses is totally blocked in the first jhÄna.
Instead, itās simply elaborating on one of the implications of the phrase āsecluded from sensualityā:
When one is secluded from oneās passion for sensual resolves, one has gone—at least temporarily—beyond the power of enticing objects of the senses to foster desire.
B.3:
āSingleness of mind is concentration.
ā —
MN 44
The argument based on this sentence takes note of two facts.
One, taking the sentence in context, the term āconcentrationā here means right concentration, and therefore the jhÄnas.
Two, the term translated as āsinglenessā here—ekāaggatÄ—can literally be interpreted as āone-pointednessā:
eka (one), agga (point), –tÄ (-ness).
From these two facts, the argument proceeds to reason that if the mind in jhÄna is truly one-pointed, it should not be aware of anything other than one point.
Thus it should not be aware of any input from the senses.
This argument is also used to deny the possibility that a meditator might be able to analyze a state of jhÄna while still in it (see āPurity of Concentration,ā below), on the grounds that, by definition, the mind cannot think and be one-pointed at the same time.
Although the two facts on which this argument is based are hard to dispute, the argument goes astray in imposing too narrow a meaning on the word ekāaggatÄ, one that is foreign to the linguistic usage of the Canon.
a) To begin with, agga has many other meanings besides āpoint.
ā In fact, it has two primary clusters of meanings, in neither of which is āpointā the central focus.
The first cluster centers on the fact that a summit of a mountain is called its agga.
Clustered around this meaning are ideas of agga as the topmost part of something (such as the ridge of a roof), the tip of something (such as the tip of a blade of grass), and the best or supreme example of something (such as the Buddha as the agga of all beings).
AN 5.80 plays with these meanings of agga when it criticizes monks of the future who will āsearch for the tiptop flavors (rasāagga) with the tip of the tongue (jivhāagga).
ā
The second cluster of meanings for agga centers on the idea of ādwellingā or āmeeting place.
ā A hall where monks gather for the uposatha, for example, is called an uposathāagga.
Given that the object of concentration is said to be a dwelling (vihÄra), and that a person dwells (viharati) in concentration, this second cluster of meanings may be the more relevant cluster here.
A mind with a single agga, in this case, would simply be a mind gathered around one object, and need not necessarily be reduced to a single point.
b) But even more telling in determining the meaning of ekāaggatÄ in the context of concentration are the everyday ways in which ekāagga, the adjective form of the noun, is used in the Canon to describe minds.
Two examples, one from the Vinaya and one from a sutta, are particularly relevant.
In Mv.
II.3.4, the phrase, āwe pay attention,ā in the instructions for how to listen to the PÄį¹imokkha, is defined as:
āWe listen with an ekāagga mind, an unscattered mind, an undistracted mind.
ā Even if ekāagga were translated as āone-pointedā here, the āpointā is obviously not so restricted as to make the ears fall silent.
Otherwise, we would not be able to hear the PÄį¹imokkha at all.
And the fact that the mind is ekāagga doesnāt mean that we canāt also hear other sounds aside from the PÄį¹imokkha.
Itās just that those sounds donāt make the mind lose its focus on a single theme.
In
AN 5.151, the Buddha lists five qualities that enable one, when listening to the true Dhamma, to āalight on assuredness, on the rightness of skillful qualities.
ā The five qualities are:
āOne doesnāt hold the talk in contempt.
āOne doesnāt hold the speaker in contempt.
āOne doesnāt hold oneself in contempt.
āOne listens to the Dhamma with an unscattered mind, an ekāagga mind.
āOne attends appropriately.
ā
Because appropriate attention means to contemplate experiences in terms of the four noble truths (see
MN 2), this passage shows that when the mind is ekāagga, itās not only able to hear.
It can also think at the same time.
If it couldnāt hear or think, it couldnāt make sense of the Dhamma talk.
So again, even if we translate ekāagga as āone-pointed,ā the ekāagga mind is not reduced to so miniscule a point that it cannot hear or think.
It is simply gathered around a single object.
And because appropriate attention deals in the same terms with which the Buddha recommends that a meditator analyze jhÄna while in it, the mind can still count as ekāagga while doing the analysis.
So, in short, when
MN 44 defines concentration as singleness or one-pointedness of mind, the definition does not preclude the ability to receive from the senses while in concentration.
B.4:
āFor the first jhÄna, noise is a thorn.
āFor the second jhÄna, directed thoughts and evaluations are thorns.
āFor the third jhÄna, rapture is a thorn.
āFor the fourth jhÄna, in-and-out breaths are thorns.
ā —
AN 10.72
This is the one sutta citation that Buddhaghosa provides in the Visuddhimagga (X.
17) to prove that the external senses must fall silent in the first jhÄna.
As noted above, though, he doesnāt substantiate his case.
To fill in this blank, modern arguments in support of Buddhaghosaās interpretation of these passages center on the meaning of the word āthornā here, saying that it means something whose presence destroys what it pierces.
Thus, to say that noise is a thorn for the first jhÄna means that if one hears a noise while in that jhÄna, the jhÄna has been brought to an end.
This interpretation is supported, the argument continues, by the pattern followed with regard to the remaining jhÄnas:
The presence of directed thought and evaluation automatically ends the second jhÄna;
the presence of rapture ends the third;
in-and-out breathing, the fourth.
However, there are altogether ten items in this suttaās list of āthorns,ā and in some of them the āthornā obviously does not destroy what it pierces.
For example:
āFor one guarding the sense doors, watching a show is a thorn.
āFor one practicing celibacy, nearness to women is a thorn.
ā
If āthornā were to mean something that cannot be present without destroying what it pierces, then nearness to women would automatically destroy a manās celibacy, and watching a show would automatically destroy oneās guarding of the senses, which isnāt true in either case.
Itās possible to be near a women and to continue being celibate, and to watch a show in such a way that doesnāt destroy your guard over your senses.
An interpretation of āthornā that consistently fits all ten items in the list, however, would be that āthornā means something that creates difficulties for what it touches.
Thus to say that directed thought and evaluation is a thorn for the second jhÄna means that these mental activities make it difficult to enter or remain in the second jhÄna;
to say that noise is a thorn for the first jhÄna simply means that noise makes it difficult to enter or remain there.
This interpretation is supported by the background story in
AN 10.72, the sutta where these thorns are listed.
It begins by telling how a group of elder monks in a monastery frequented by noisy laypeople leave for a quieter monastery with the thought, āThe jhÄnas are said by the Blessed One to be thorned by noise.
What if we were to go to the Gosiį¹
ga SÄla forest park?
There we would live comfortably, with next-to-no noise, next-to-no crowding.
ā When the Buddha learns of what they have done, he praises them.
Had he wanted to make the point that noise cannot be heard in the first jhÄna, he would have criticized them for going to the trouble of leaving the first monastery, and recommended that if they wanted to escape the disturbance of noise, they should have entered the first jhÄna and dwelled comfortably there instead.
But he didnāt.
So this sutta proves nothing more than that noise makes it difficult to enter or maintain the first jhÄna.
It doesnāt prove that noises cannot be heard while in the jhÄna.
From the discussion of these four citations—
DN 2,
AN 9.38,
MN 44, and
AN 10.72—we can conclude that none of them provide convincing proof that the physical senses have to fall silent in the first jhÄna—or any of the four jhÄnas.
This means that the conclusions drawn from
AN 9.37,
MN 43, and the standard formula for the dimension of the infinitude of space still stand:
The physical senses may fall silent in the formless attainments, but there is no need for them to fall silent in the four jhÄnas.
And because awakening can be based on any of the four jhÄnas, this means further that a meditator can attain awakening without entering into a concentration attainment where the senses are blocked from his/her awareness.
Purity of Concentration
This still leaves open, however, another question:
Is it necessary for the external senses to fall silent in the formless attainments, or is it simply possible for them to fall silent in those attainments?
In other words, when focusing on a formless perception, if one pays no heed to perceptions of multiplicity and yet they keep occurring in such a way that sensory input is not blocked out, would that still count as a formless attainment?
Causality as described in dependent co-arising leaves this open as a theoretical possibility, because causal influences within the mind can act not only immediately—as when inattention to perceptions of multiplicity right now could block an awareness of the external senses right now—but also over time, as when attention to perceptions in the past might allow for an awareness of the external senses right now.
In other words, if a meditator pays attention to perceptions of sound consistently before entering concentration, that act of attention could theoretically allow those perceptions to persist during the subsequent period of concentration when he/she was no longer giving them any attention at all.
However, the suttas do not say whether this theoretical possibility actually applies in practice.
In fact, the only narrative account that addresses the issue is found in the Vinaya—the division of the Canon dealing with monastic rules.
Because it is so short, and because its primary concern is with disciplinary issues, it does not address the Dhamma side of the issue in any conclusive detail.
But it does raise some important points.
The story is this:
Then Ven.
MahÄ MoggallÄna addressed the monks:
āJust now, friends, having attained the imperturbable concentration on the bank of the SappinikÄ River, I heard the sound of elephants plunging in, crossing over, and making a trumpeting call.
ā
The monks were offended and annoyed and spread it about, āNow, how can Ven.
MoggallÄna say, āJust now, friends, having attained the imperturbable concentration on the bank of the SappinikÄ River, I heard the sound of elephants plunging in, crossing over, and making a trumpeting call.
ā Heās claiming a superior-human state.
ā They reported this matter to the Blessed One, (who said,) āThere is that concentration, monks, but it is not purified.
MoggallÄna spoke truly, monks.
There is no offense for him.
ā — Pr 4
This passage appears as part of the explanation of the fourth rule in the monksā PÄį¹imokkha, or monastic code, a rule covering false claims of meditative attainments.
Its main concern is with whether Ven.
MoggallÄna violated this rule in making his statement about hearing the elephants.
There is, however, a technical Dhamma term at stake here:
āimperturbable concentration (ÄneƱja-samÄdhi).
ā
MN 66 states that the first three jhÄnas are perturbable—subject to movement—whereas the fourth jhÄna isnāt.
The first jhÄna is perturbable in that it includes directed thought and evaluation;
the second, in that it includes rapture-pleasure;
the third, in that it includes equanimity-pleasure.
MN 66 does not describe exactly what qualities in the fourth jhÄna make it imperturbable—aside from the fact that it lacks the preceding factors—but
AN 9.34 and
AN 9.41 provide a suggestion.
They note that although the fourth jhÄna is marked by purity of equanimity, it does not focus on perceptions dealing with equanimity.
This means that even though phenomena apart from the object of concentration may be present, the mind neither focuses on them nor is it disturbed by thoughts or feeling tones around those perceptions.
But the fourth jhÄna is not the only stage of concentration that counts as imperturbable.
MN 106, without following the standard descriptions of the concentration attainments, cites an imperturbable concentration based on perceptions of forms—this is apparently the fourth jhÄna—and one that is based on abandoning perceptions of forms.
Because it goes on to say that the dimension of nothingness lies beyond the imperturbable, āimperturbableā would apply to two formless attainments:
the dimension of the infinitude of space and the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness.
Thus there are three levels of imperturbable concentration in all.
Unfortunately, the account in Pr 4 does not indicate which of these three stages of concentration Ven.
MoggallÄna was in, so we cannot say for sure whether this account applies to any of the formless attainments.
Nor does it explain what the Buddha meant by ānot purified.
ā Given the different ways āpurifiedā is used in the suttas, it could mean many things.
As we noted above, āpurifiedā—with reference to the fourth jhÄna—is used in two senses:
In the standard formula for the concentration attainments, āpurifiedā refers to purity of mindfulness and equanimity.
In the Buddhaās description of his own mastery of the fourth jhÄna, āpurifiedā appears in a list that suggests freedom from defilement:
āWhen the mind was thus concentrated, purified, bright, unblemished, rid of defilement, pliant, malleable, steady, and attained to imperturbability.
ā¦ā
With reference to the formless attainments,
MN 43 uses the word āpurifiedā in what may be another sense, indicating a consciousness divorced from the five sense faculties.
This would seem to be the meaning of the word most relevant in the context of Ven.
MoggallÄnaās story.
After all, simply hearing the sound of elephants is not a defilement (see
SN 35.191(232)), and if the purity of equanimity and mindfulness in the fourth jhÄna can be used to hear divine sounds (see
MN 4), it can surely also be used to hear the sound of trumpeting elephants.
However, given the uncertainty surrounding this story, there is no firm proof that this is what āpurifiedā means here.
The Commentary to this story, in discussing the term ānot purified,ā assumes that Ven.
MoggallÄna had left the factors of jhÄna entirely when he heard the sound of the elephants.
The Sub-commentary seems closer to the mark in assuming that he had reverted briefly to factors of a lower jhÄna, such as directed thought and evaluation.
If MoggallÄna had entirely left the jhÄnas when hearing the elephants, the Buddha would not have said that he had spoken truly about which stage of concentration he was in, and instead would have said that MoggallÄna spoke out of a misunderstanding.
That would have been enough to exonerate MoggallÄna from an offense under the rule.
But because the Buddha said that Ven.
MoggallÄna spoke truly, we have to assume that MoggallÄna was in a state of imperturbable concentration, even though the attainment of that concentration was not pure.
This means that we have to further assume that the Canon allows for a certain amount of leeway in classifying what counts as a particular stage of right concentration.
The fourth jhÄna, for example, can vary somewhat in the extent to which it is purified of the factors of a lower jhÄna—at least momentarily—and yet still qualify as being the fourth jhÄna.
The dimension of the infinitude of space might vary in the extent to which consciousness is purified of any connection to the five physical senses.
This point helps to explain an apparent anomaly in the way the suttas describe the attainment of the different stages of right concentration.
As noted above, there are some cases in which they say simply that the meditator enters and remains in a particular stage.
In others, they say that the meditator, while remaining in that stage, analyzes the stage in terms of the fabrications of which it is composed, gains a sense of dispassion for those fabrications, and as a result gains release.
As
AN 9.36 shows, the process of analysis involves some fairly extensive use of perceptions, along with directed thought and evaluation, even while the meditator is in the state being analyzed.
This would not be an anomaly in the case of the first jhÄna, which includes directed thought and evaluation as one of its defining qualities.
But the suttas state explicitly that this can also happen in the second jhÄna—which is defined as resulting from the abandoning of directed thought and evaluation—and on up through the even more refined levels, including the dimension of nothingness.
According to
MN 111, the only attainments in which the meditator must mindfully leave the attainment before analyzing it are the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception and the cessation of perception and feeling.
If there were no leeway in the descriptions of the various concentration attainments, this sort of analysis would be impossible in any of the attainments beyond the first jhÄna.
However, given the Buddhaās comment in the story of Ven.
MoggallÄna, indicating that the concentration attainments can vary somewhat in their level of purity and still count as right concentration, this sort of analysis is possible.
And, in fact, the ability to step back from oneās concentration while fabricating it is a useful skill, because it is one of the ways in which a meditator can achieve awakening.
This skill is what Ven.
SÄriputta, in
MN 43, calls āthe eye of discernment.
ā
AN 5.28 picks up the theme of vision to describe this skill with an analogy:
āAnd further, the monk [having mastered the four jhÄnas] has his theme of reflection well in hand, well attended to, well-pondered, well-tuned [well-penetrated] by means of discernment.
āJust as if one person were to reflect on another, or a standing person were to reflect on a sitting person, or a sitting person were to reflect on a person lying down;
even so, monks, the monk has his theme of reflection well in hand, well attended to, well-pondered, well-tuned [well-penetrated] by means of discernment.
This is the fifth development of the five-factored noble right concentration.
ā —
AN 5.28
In other words, the meditator can step back or step above the attainment, without destroying it, and penetrate it by means of the eye of discernment to the point of awakening.
To use a more modern analogy, a meditator developing concentration for the sake of a pleasant abiding is like a hand fully snug in a glove;
one developing concentration for the sake of the ending of the effluents is like a hand pulled slightly out of the glove but not so far that it leaves the glove.
As the Buddha learned on the night of his awakening, the ability to analyze oneās jhÄna requires an even higher level of skill than the simple ability to enter and remain in the jhÄna, for the latter skill, on its own, cannot bring about awakening (see
AN 4.123), whereas the former skill can.
The Right Use of Concentration
Thus, even though Ven.
MahÄ MoggallÄnaās story gives no hard evidence one way or the other as to whether a meditator in the formless attainments could hear sounds, it does clear up an important issue surrounding the practice of right concentration for the purpose of full release.
An attainment of concentration does not have to be fully pure in order to qualify as right—and, in fact, if one knows how to use the impurity of oneās attainment, it can actually be an aid to awakening.
And thereās no need for right concentration to block out sounds.
After all, one can gain awakening from any of the four jhÄnas.
AN 9.37 and
MN 43—in not listing those jhÄnas as among those where one is insensitive to or divorced from the physical senses—stand as proof that they donāt automatically block out sensory input.
The important point about concentration is how one uses it.
As the Buddha says in
MN 152, if the consummate development of oneās faculties simply consisted in the ability not to see sights or hear sounds, then blind and deaf people would count as consummate in their faculties.
Consummation in this area actually consists of the discernment that allows one to be uninfluenced by sensory input even as one is fully aware of that input.
Äįø·Ära KÄlÄma had strong concentration—strong enough to block the sound of 500 carts passing by—but he took it no further.
He treated it as an end rather than a means because he lacked insight into how to contemplate it with the eye of discernment to reach awakening.
The same point applies to the inhabitants of the dimension of non-percipient beings.
As for Ven.
MahÄ MoggallÄna:
Even though his concentration may not have been as pure as theirs—at least on the day he sat by the river—he was still able to use it as a means for going beyond all fabrication, and in that way reach total release.
In the final analysis, thatās what counts.
This bubble represents the four EBT jhÄnas: The pin pressing on it is how sound affects a meditator. The higher the jhÄna, the less the thorn is felt, but the sound can still be heard. The possible exception would be a purified imperturbable fourth jhÄna, which straddles both rupa and arupa.
The impenetrable fortress bubble represents VRJ, the Visuddhimagga Redefinition of JhÄna (all four rupa JhÄnas). Sound can only be a thorn before you enter that fortress. Once youāre inside, you canāt hear sounds, you canāt feel mosquito bites, smell aromas, etc. The mind is divorced from the 5 sense faculties.